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The 1982 UNCLOS, as a comprehensive regulation of the sea, provides
in article 25 that a Coastal State has the right to perform any certain act to
prevent non-innocent passage. Therefore, it is clear that the task of maintaining
internal security is being assigned to each Coastal State. Meanwhile, in article
100, 1982 UNCLOS provides that States must cooperate to take action against
piracy on the high seas, and article 108 is designed to combat drug trafficking.
This means that, in order to maintain security over maritime territories bordering on the territory of other States, a State can enter into a regional cooperation
agreement to be more effective and efficient.
Indonesia needs to enhance its understanding of its status as an Archipelagic States and what that entails. This Status brings responsibility to Indonesia
in the form of rights and obligations. Therefore, Indonesian people need to be
educated about Indonesia’s status as a maritime State, so that a strong and
proper maritime defense can result. The ratification of the PALERMO Convention brings about great responsibility to the Indonesian Government to cooperate with other States in combating TOC, as well as, of course, to maintain
maritime security at the regional level, especially in Southeast Asia.
Arising from that issue, the Indonesian Government has to reflect that Indonesia needs a strong Naval force. It is true that Indonesia is not in good
economic condition. However, a State consists of people, territory and Government. If the territory is disrupted, then the people and the government will
not be able to function properly. Thus, careful steps should be taken to complete Indonesia’s Naval forces, including a comprehensive maritime territory
patrol program, so that Indonesia’s territory and international stripe can be safe
and free from Terrorism and Piracy. Then, the intervention of foreign parties
can be avoided and the State’s sovereignty maintained. A respectful and beneficial cooperation among States in Southeast Asia must be fostered by harmonizing perceptions, policies and strengths, and by establishing a workable extradition agreement.
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Can the Requirements of Shariah Law Regarding
Criminal Punishments be interpreted in a way that is
Compatible with the ICCPR and CAT?
Alfitri1
Criminal law deals with the protection of public interests and values deemed
to be crucial for a particular society. In Islam, these values are ascribed to the
divine commands. Thus, there will be calls from some Muslims for the
implementation of Islamic criminal law by the state for they believe that this is
required by Islam. Can therefore the death penalty or corporal punishments
required by the Shariah law be imposed by a state while they are in conflict
with the state’s obligation to comply with international human rights
instruments? This paper will analyze this uneasy situation faced by some
Muslim countries implementing Islamic criminal law but party to the ICCPR
and CAT. It aims at verifying that an extreme universalism or cultural relativism
approach regarding the validity of international human rights norms on this
matter is insufficient. This is because Islamic doctrines strongly influence
Muslims on this matter and failure to seriously engage them will lead to rejection
of international human rights instruments which are important for protecting
individual rights. This paper argues that an approach that is able to reconcile
the requirements of Shariah law regarding criminal punishments and those of
international human rights norms is necessary.
Keywords: Shariah Law, Criminal Punishment, ICCPR, CAT

I.

Introduction

Criminal law is a collection of laws regulating the power of the state to
impose punishments on a person in order to enforce compliance with certain
1

The author is a lecturer of the Department of Sharia of Sekolah Tinggi Agama Islam Negeri
(STAIN) Samarinda. Author completing S1 and S2 in the field of Islamic law in Universitas Islam
Negeri (UIN) Sunan Kalijaga Yogyakarta. With scholarship from the Australian Development
Scholarships (ADS) the author took Master of Laws (LL. AD) program in the Melbourne Law
School, the University of Melbourne. Author continue his studies in the United States in Fall of
2009 with Fulbright scholarship for Ph.D. degree. Author’s research interests include Islamic Law
(Civil and Criminal), International Human Rights Law and Civil Society Law. The author has
presented his research results at conferences/seminars both national and international and published
them in numerous refereed journal international law such as the Journal of Law and Religion and
the Asian Journal of Comparative Law. Currently the author is still listed as a researcher at the
Asian Law Center, Melbourne Law School, and the University of Melbourne.
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rules.2 Unlike civil law which regulates legal proceedings relating to private rights
and obligations, criminal law deals with the protection of public interests and
values deemed to be crucial for a particular society, even if the immediate interest protected is a private interest.3
Despite this fact, the interests and values which are protected by criminal
law differ from society to society. A case in point is sexual intercourse. For
some societies, the involvement of two adults in a consensual sexual act is of no
concern to the authorities since such an act is not deemed to be a transgression
of public interests, or even public values. For other societies, however, such an
act is considered illicit because the values of the society regulate that sexual
contact is only allowed within a marriage. Therefore, the rules governing sexual
intercourse are crucial for this society and offences against the rules are severely punished by the state in order to maintain social order.4
Criminal laws therefore shed light on what constitute the core values of a
society and its rulers.5 Since protection of the core values is crucial to public
interests and order which may be damaged by violations against them, meting
out punishments prescribed by the core values themselves is also instrumental.
The core values of Islam, for example, are ascribed to the divine commands. Hence, by failing to implement the divine commands on criminal law,
society perceives that they have denied and terribly disobeyed God,6 and as a
consequence, the whole society will take responsibility for this failure and disobedience in the Hereafter. Hence, calls from some Muslims for the implementation of Islamic criminal law by the state in their countries can be understood.
While the reasons for coming back to Islamic criminal law may be practical,
namely as a panacea for the degradation of morality in society since existing
criminal laws are deemed to have failed,7 belief in the divinity of Islamic law is

paramount, namely Islamic criminal law must be implemented by the state because it is required by Islam.
Can therefore the death penalty or corporal punishment be imposed by a
state because they are required by Shariah, but at the same time, they are in
conflict with the state’s obligation to comply with international human rights
instruments? Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR), for example, guarantees the right to life and considers the right supreme. The Human Rights Committee has therefore adopted a resolution to
annul the death sentence.8 In addition, Article 7 of the ICCPR and Article 1 of
the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishments (CAT) prohibit corporal punishments.
This paper will thus analyze whether the requirement of Shariah law regarding criminal punishments can be interpreted in a way that is compatible with
international human rights instruments, particularly with the prohibition against
the death penalty and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment or punishments
in the ICCPR and CAT. This is so since death by stoning or crucifixion and
corporal punishment by amputation or flogging are prescribed by the Shariah
law.
This paper argues that the problem is complex and cannot be solved simply by means of universalism or cultural relativist claims exclusively. An approach that tries to reconcile the requirement of international human rights norms
and the Shariah law in criminal punishments is very much needed. This is because religious tenets strongly influence Muslims on this matter and failure to
seriously engage Islamic doctrines, , will thus lead to the rejection of international human rights instruments which are important for protecting individual
rights.9

2

Rudolph Peters, Crime and Punishment in Islamic Law: Theory and Practice from the
Sixteenth to the Twenty-first Century (2005) 1.
3
Ibid. An example of this is theft, which is a crime against private property rights. Yet, since
the protection of property is essential for securing social order, a breach against private property
rights is a punishable offence in almost all societies, and is ‘cured’ by stronger remedies than those
available under private law, namely fines and imprisonment. See Ibid.
4
Likewise, different societies will have different interests and values with regard to the
consumption of alcoholic beverages and other psychotropic substances. This may lead to different
stances with regard to regulating them in criminal law. See ibid.
5
Ibid
6
See e.g., Muhammad ‘Ata Al-Sid Sid Ahmad, Islamic Criminal Law: The Hudud (1995) 8.
7
See e.g., for the case in Indonesia, Bahtiar Effendy, Islam and the State in Indonesia (2003),
209-210, 217-218.
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II. Islamic Criminal Justice: Basic Concept and Philosophy
The requirements of Shariah law regarding criminal law is enshrined in the
two major sources of Islamic doctrine, i.e., the Koran and the Hadith. Thirty

8

The Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR aiming at the abolition of the death, adopted
and proclaimed by General Assembly resolution 44/128 of 15 December 1989, article 1(1).
9
Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im, ‘Islam and Human Rights: Beyond the Universality Debate’
(2000) 94 American Society for International Law Proceedings 95.

Volume 7 No. 1 October 2009

105

Jurnal Hukum Internasional

Requirements of Shariah Law Regarding Criminal Punishments

verses out of 6,342 verses in the Koran address criminal law matters10 encompassing offences and specific types of punishment for each offence as well as
some rules of evidence for each offence to be established. These verses than
become foundational principles and the ends of the first category of Islamic
criminal law, namely hudud.11 (The categories of Islamic criminal law will be
explained below).
Together with particular verses as such, the Koran also provides general
verses which might exemplify the incumbency of Muslims to uphold the supremacy of Shariah law.12 In chapter IV (an-Nisa’): 59, for example, Muslims
are required to obey God, the Prophet Muhammad and those who have the
legal authority (uli al-‘amr).13 This requirement includes not transgressing God’s
commands regarding crimes. This is so because since one has embraced Islam,
one is fully bound by Shariah law and responsible for the actualization of it.14
Opting out of what God and the Prophet have decided is considered to be
unfitting and disobedient; and the actors are deemed to be on a clearly wrong
path.15
The Prophet Muhammad functioned as the clarifier and exemplar of the
Koran. With the given authority, the Prophet explained the Koran through his
words, deeds and agreements on actions conducted by his companions. This
concept is known as the Prophet’s traditions (Sunnah), and the verbalization of
his Sunnah is called Hadith. In Islamic discourse, the Sunnah is considered a
leading legal and religious authority after the Koran.16 In one of his Hadith, the
Prophet explained the importance of the hudud and the mandatory nature of its
implementation:17
The parable of the people who are upholding the hudud and those who are
disregarding them is like that of a people tossed up on a double-decker ship.
Some occupy the upper deck and some occupy the lower. Those occupying

the lower deck have to go up to bring drinking water down. Perceiving this
practice as arduous and disturbing, they decide to make an opening in their part
(as a short cut to water). If the occupants of the upper tier allow them to go
ahead, they will all, certainly, drown. But if they forbid them, they will all certainly, reach safety. 18
From the two major sources of Islamic doctrines and the consensus of the
first generations of the Muslim scholars, Islamic criminal law then was theorized
and formularized by Islamic jurists within the first three centuries since the birth
of Islam. 19 Islamic criminal law became established and classic with the emergence of four Sunni legal schools of thought (madhhab) in the tenth century.
They are the madhhab of Maliki (Malikiyyah), Hanafi (Hanafiyyah), Shafi‘i
(Shafi‘iyyah), and Hanbali (Hanabilah).20 There are some differences of doctrinal penal law among the four madhhab. Furthermore, the four madhhab spread
across Muslim countries influencing, to some extent, the content of Islamic criminal law in each area. Analyzing the implementation of Islamic criminal law thus
must also consider the madhhab adhered to by states enforcing it.
There are three categories of crimes and punishments under Islamic criminal law: hudud; qisas; and ta‘zir. Hudud is crimes against the claims of God
whose punishments are specified in the Koran and the Hadith.21 There are
seven offences under the auspices of hudud:22 theft (sariqah) punishable with
amputation of a hand;23 banditry (hirabah) punishable with death, crucifixion,
cross-amputation of the hand and foot or banishment;24 rising against the legitimate leader by use of force (baghy) punishable with being fought until they
18

See Khan, ‘Juristic Classification of Islamic Law’ (1983) 6 Houston Journal of International
Law 23, 27.
11
Muhammad ‘Ata al-Sid Sid Ahmad, above n 5, 115.
12
The general verses exemplifying the incumbency are contemplated by ibid, 104-105.
13
See The Holy Quran, IV: 59, text, translation and commentary by Abdullah Yusuf Ali
14
Muhammad ‘Ata al-Sid Sid Ahmad, above n 5, 104.
15
See The Holy Qur’an, XXXIII: 36.
16
See Irshad Abdal-Haqq, ‘Islamic Law: An Overview of Its Origin and Elements’, (Spring/
Summer 1996) 1 The Journal of Islamic Law
17
Muhammad ‘Ata al-Sid Sid Ahmad, above n 5, 115.

The Hadith is from Sahih al-Bukhari as quoted and translated by Muhammad ‘Ata al-Sid
Sid Ahmad, above n 5, 115-116.
19
See about the development of Islamic law in general in Noel J. Coulson, ‘The State and
Individual in Islamic Law’ (1957) 6 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 75.
20
See about the formation of legal schools in Islamic law in e.g., Wael B. Hallaq, The Origins
and Evolution of Islamic Law (2005) chapter 7.
21
Aly Mansour, ‘Hudud Crimes’, in M. Cherif Bassiouni (ed.), The Islamic Criminal Justice
System (1982) 195, 195-201.
22
See ibid, 197-200; Muhammad ‘Ata al-Sid Sid Ahmad, above n 5, 58-71.
23
See the Holy Koran, V: 41 ‘As to the thief, male or female, Cut off his or her hands: A
punishment by way of example, from God, for their crime: and God is Exalted in Power’,
translation by Abdullah Yusuf Ali.
24
See the Holy Koran, V: 36 ‘The punishment of those who wage war against God and His
Apostle, and strive with might and main for mischief through the land is: execution, or crucifixion,
or the cutting off of hands and feet from opposite sides, or exile from the land …’, translation by
Abdullah Yusuf Ali.
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comply with the command of God;25 unlawful sexual intercourse (zina) punishable with stoning to death for married persons (adultery) or one hundred lashes
for unmarried persons (fornication);26 false accusation of unchastity (qadhf)
punishable with eighty lashes;27 apostasy (riddah) punishable with death;28 intoxication (sharb al-khamr) punishable with forty or eighty lashes.29
Qisas are offences against persons in the form of physical assault and murder punishable with retaliation (the return of life for a life in case of murder, or
the same wound in case of physical assault).30 The punishments for qisas crimes
may be waived by the victim or the surviving heirs and they can ask for financial
compensation (diya or blood-money) or pardon the offender. This is because
qisas is crimes related to the claims of human beings as opposed to the claims
of God in hudud crimes.31
Ta’zir is offences the punishments for which are not fixed by the Koran
and the Hadith.32
It covers provisions relating to discretionary punishment of sinful behavior
which imperils state security or public order.33 Hence, most Islamic jurists agree
that it is a state responsibility to initiate prosecution of ta’zir crimes pursuant to
its duty to maintain public order and welfare.34 Akin to qisas crimes, ta’zir are
25

See the Holy Koran, XLIX: 9.
See the Holy Koran, XXIV: 2 ‘The woman and the man guilty of adultery or fornication,
flog each of them with a hundred stripes: Let not compassion move you in their case, in a matter
prescribed by God, if ye believe in God and the Last Day’, translation by Abdullah Yusuf Ali; the
Hadith‘… the muhsans [married persons] are liable to hundred lashes and stoning, and ghair al
muhsans [unmarried persons] are liable to hundred lashes and banishment for one year” as quoted
by Muhammad ‘Ata al-Sid Sid Ahmad, above n , 68.
27
See the Holy Koran, XXIV: 4 ‘And those who launch a charge against chaste women, and
produce not four witnesses (to support their allegations), flog them with eighty stripes …’,
translation by Abdullah Yusuf Ali.
28
The Hadith‘No Muslim witnessing that there is no God but [Allah] and that Muhammad
is His messenger is to be killed except in three cases: a self for a self [murder], the married
adulterer, and the one who departs from the religion [Islam] and abandons the jama‘ah (bond of
believers)’ as quoted by Muhammad ‘Ata al-Sid Sid Ahmad, above n 5, 58.
29
See Aly Mansour, above n 20, 200.
30
See Rudolph Peters, above n 1, 7; Matthew Lippman, ‘Islamic Criminal Law and Procedure:
Religious Fundamentalism v. Modern Law’ (1989) 12 Boston College International and
Comparative Law Review 38.
31
See M. Cherif Bassiouni, ‘Quesas Crimes’, in M. Cherif Bassiouni (ed.), The Islamic
Criminal Justice System (1982) 203, 203-205.
32
See Ghaouti Benmelha, ‘Ta’azir Crimes’, in M. Cherif Bassiouni (ed.), The Islamic
Criminal Justice System (1982) 211, 211-225.
33
Rudolph Peters, above n 1, 7.
34
Matthew Lippman, above n 29, 39.
26

108

Indonesia Journal of International Law

also related to the claims of human beings; thus, the victim may ask the ruler to
pardon the offender, and the ruler may discretionally choose not to punish the
offender. 35 Being residual but comprehensive, ta’zir may sanction the state to
punish all other types of sinful or socially and politically unpleasing behaviors.
Since the punitive powers of the state are hardly restricted under the doctrine of
ta’zir, the accused may only enjoy little protection.36
As mentioned earlier, the doctrine of Islamic criminal law may vary pursuant to each madhhab in Islamic law. Cases in point are intoxication and apostasy. While the majority of jurists founding the madhhab agree that intoxication
is a hudud crime, other jurists consider it to be ta’zir. Regarding its punishment, the Hanafiyyah, the Malikiyyah, and the Hanabilah maintain that convicted intoxication is to be punished with eight lashes whilst al-Shafi‘i (the founder
the Shafi‘iyyah) and few other jurists hold forty lashes.37 Apostasy as a hudud
crime punishable by death is also contested by some contemporary Muslim
Scholars and jurists. According to them, apostasy may only become a hudud
crime punishable by death if it involves acts of rebellion against the state.38
Despite this fact, classical and contemporary Muslim jurists (fuqaha) do
not deny the severity of hudud punishments. To them, the harsh punishments of
hudud can be justified from their purpose, i.e., hudud punishments are meant
to, and actually do, deter similar offences prescribed by the Koran and the
Hadith in the future.39
In addition, the fuqaha further argue that the hudud punishments can only
be imposed after rigorous proceedings have taken place. This is because the
fuqaha have laid down an extremely meticulous standard of proof for all the
hudud offences that must stand beyond ‘any atom of doubt’ (shubha)40 pursuant to the Prophet Hadith ‘avert the hudud punishment in case of doubt … for
error in clemency is better than error in imposing punishment’.41 For example
the rule of evidence for unlawful sexual intercourse (zina), four trustworthy
witnesses witnessing the actual act of sexual penetration are required by the
35

See Ibid.
Rudolp Peters, above n 1, 7.
37
See Mashood A. Baderin, International Human Rights and Islamic Law (2003) 79.
38
See ibid.
39
See Mashood A. Baderin, above n 36, 80.
40
Ibid
41
The Hadith quoted by Wahbah al-Zuhayli, al-Fiqh al-Islami wa Adillatuh vol. 7 (1997)
5307, translation by Mashood A. Baderin, above n 39, 80.
36
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Shariah law. Failure to do so will prompt the accuser and the witnesses to be
charged and punished for the qadhf (false accusation of unchastity) punishable
by eighty lashes.42
Given its arduous standard, it is believed that the imposition of hudud punishment for the zina is almost impossible since it is only applicable to those
committing such an act openly without due regard for public morality at all.43 In
the hudud crime of theft likewise, the fuqaha have narrowly defined it as: ‘surreptitiously taking away (movable) property of a certain minimum value (nisab)44
which is not partially owned by the perpetrator nor entrusted to him from a
place which is locked or under guard (hirz)’.45 Any act of stealing that does not
meet the above elements is not charged under the hudud crime of theft punishable with amputation, but it may be charged under the ta’zir crimes.

Determination
Article 1(1) of the ICCPR guarantees the right of self-determination of all
people. People are free to determine their political status and to pursue their
economic, social and cultural development.48 The Human Rights Committee,
however, has not given a clear definition of self-determination for the purposes
of the ICCPR. Meanwhile, the right of self-determination is important for achieving all civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights.49 According to Joseph, Schultz and Castan, self-determination is the collective right of peoples50
characterized as having a common historical tradition, racial or ethnic identity,
cultural homogeneity, linguistic unity, religious or ideological affinity, territorial
connection, common economic life and comprising a certain minimum number.51

Besides the principle of uncertainty (shubha), the principle of repentance
(tawba) also precludes the imposition of the hudud punishments in Islamic
criminal law. This can be explained from another end of punishment in Islamic
criminal law, i.e., the rehabilitation of the offender. By showing his repentance,
the offender is deemed to have proved that he/she has been reformed and,
thus, punishment is considered unnecessary. The liability of offences against the
claims of human beings such as homicide, wounding or false accusation of unchastity, however, does not lapse with the offender’s repentance.46 Considering its sophisticated concept, some Muslims jurists and scholars endorse the
implementation of Islamic criminal law and maintain the compatibility of Islamic
criminal law with human rights.47

The question is whether the requirements of Shariah regarding criminal
punishment can be counted the right of self-determination. The special rights of
Muslims to implement their religious laws may also be understood as an International community respecting the internal right of self-determination of the
Muslims which is required under Article 1 of the ICCPR. This includes determining their cultural development without outside interference.52 Historically,
Islamic criminal punishment was a part of the culture of Muslim countries and it
was effective in their legal systems. The situation changed when most Muslim
countries were colonized by European countries. European (Continental or
Anglo-Saxon) criminal laws were introduced and Islamic laws were systematically replaced by colonial laws, except for Islamic family law. 53
The ICCPR protects the right to freedom of religion. Article 18(1) of the
ICCPR stipulates that:

III. (In) Compatibility of Islamic Criminal Law with ICCPR and CAT

‘Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and reli-

A. The Requirements of Islamic Criminal Law and the Right of Self48

See Muhammad ‘Ata al-Sid Sid Ahmad, above n 5, 69; Rudolph Peters, above n 1, 61;
Matthew Lippman, above n 29, 40.
43
See Mashood. A Baderin, above n 36, 80.
44
The value of stolen goods must be at least 8.91 grams of silver or 1.06 grams of gold
pursuant to the Malikiyyah and the Shafi‘iyyah; or 29.7 grams of silver according to the Hanafiyyah,
see Rudolph Peters, above n 1, 56.
45
See ibid.
46
See ibid, 27.
47
See e.g., Muhammad ‘Ata al-Sid Sid Ahmad, above n 5; M. Cherif Bassiouni (ed.), The
Islamic Criminal Justice System (1982).

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),
Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly resolution
2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966, article 1(1).
49
Sarah Joseph, Jenny Schultz, and Melissa Castan, The International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights: Cases, Materials, and Commentary (2nd ed, 2004) 141-142.
50
Ibid, 142.
51
Robert McCorquodale, ‘Self-Determination: a Human Rights Approach’ (1994) 43
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 857, 856.
52
General Recommendation No. 21: Right to self-determination: 23/08/96. Gen. Rec. No.
21. (General Comments), para 4, <http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/
dc598941c9e68a1a8025651e004d31d0?Opendocument> at 7 August 2006.
53
See about this e.g., Mathew Lippman, above n 29, 34-37.
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gion. This right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of
his choice, and freedom, either individually or in community with others and in
public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching’.54
Manifestation of a religion may cover a broad range of acts since the concept of worship in the ICCPR includes not only ritual and ceremonial acts giving direct expression to belief, but also a range of practices integral to such
acts.55 It is conceived that the manifestation of a religion is an active element of
one’s religious freedom per contra a passive element of one’s religious freedom
which only comprises adherence to certain beliefs.56 This is because having a
religion or belief, one manifests it in worship, the teaching of the particular beliefs, and observance of specified canons of conduct or religious rituals.57
However, the manifestation of a religion may interfere with other people’s
rights or cause harm to a society. The freedom to manifest religion, therefore, is
not an absolute right. Article 18(3) of the ICCPR, in fact, provides a limitation
clause which allows religious expression to be restricted in certain circumstances
‘… as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order,
health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others’.58 Accordingly, the freedom to manifest religion can be legitimately limited as long as the
limitation is clearly stipulated in a legal instrument or decision accessible by the
public.59
In addition, the limitation is set up within the context of realizing one of the
objectives of Article 18(3), namely the protection of public safety, order, health,
or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others.
General Comment No. 22 of article 18(3) insists that the limitation or restriction on the manifestation of religion should not be undertaken for discriminatory purposes or be applied in a discriminatory manner. Even a prisoner or a

person already subject to certain legitimate constraints, can still exercise his/her
right to manifest his/her religion ‘to the fullest extent compatible with the specific
nature of the constraint’.60 A case in point is Boodoo v Trinidad and Tobago
(721/96). In the author’s individual complaint to the Human Rights Committee,
it is revealed that the author had been prohibited from wearing a beard and
from worshipping at religious service. His prayer books were also taken from
him. With regard to the allegation, Trinidad and Tobago did not give any explanation. The Human Rights Committee concluded that a breach of Article18 of
the ICCPR had occurred. In this case, the Committee reaffirmed the broad
range of acts covered by the freedom to manifest religion or belief in worship,
observance, practice and teaching.61
Given the above, limitations on the freedom to manifest religion or belief
are illegitimate; inter alia, if they are designed to prevent a religious adherent
from performing his/her religious rituals as well as practices integral to such
acts. The problem is whether the ban on Islamic criminal punishment in Muslim
countries, therefore, falls within the purposes enumerated in Article 18(3). Some
individual complaints under Article18 of the ICCPR to the Human Rights Committee may give some perspectives in answering the question, namely Singh
Bhinder v Canada (208/86) and Coeriel and Aurik v The Netherlands (453/
91).62
Neither complaint, however, provides a precedent for the possibility of
complaints about the restriction on manifesting religion in the form of the requirements of Islamic criminal law. Furthermore, conclusions yielded by the
Human Rights Committee are criticized for falling short. In Singh Bhinder v
Canada (208/86) for example, the conclusion did not spell out how the restriction on wearing a turban, as obliged by the author’s religion (Sikh), conformed
to Article 18(3).
In this regard, Joseph, Schultz and Castan conclude that the Human Rights
Committee had not issued much consensus jurisprudence on the rights enshrined
in Article 18. The committee, nevertheless, has comprehensively stated on the

54

ICCPR, article 18(1).
General Comment No. 22: The right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion (Art.
18): 30/07/93. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.4, General Comment No. 22. (General Comments), para 4,
< h t t p : / / w w w . u n h c h r . c h / t b s / d o c . n s f / ( S y m b o l ) /
9a30112c27d1167cc12563ed004d8f15?Opendocument> at 7 August 2006.
56
Joseph, Schultz and Castan, above n 48, 506.
57
Ibid.
58
ICCPR, article 18(3).
55
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59

Joseph, Schultz and Castan, above n 48, 507
General Comment No 22, above n 54, para 8.
61
Joseph, Schultz and Castan, above n 48, 506.
62
See ibid, 508-510.
60
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topic in General Comment No. 22 of the ICCPR. As a result, a more vigorous
approach to the protection of one’s religion and belief is provided by the General Comment than that displayed in the relevant Optional Protocol cases. This
is so since the latter tend to show a relatively conservative approach being
employed by the Human Rights Committee with regard to the right to life.63
B. Islamic Criminal Punishments and the Right to Life
Since the requirement of Shariah law regarding criminal punishments may
involve types of capital punishment or corporal punishment, it is also relevant to
analyze the requirements of Articles 6 and 7 of the ICCPR as well as Article
16(1) of the CAT. General Comments from the Human Rights Committee related to the Articles will further explain whether Islamic criminal punishments
are compatible with international human rights law, in particular with the prohibition against torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.
Article 6 of the ICCPR concerns the right to life. The right has been described by the Human Rights Committee as the supreme right.64 Six paragraphs
of Article 6 provide negative and positive components of the right to life that
must be undertaken by the State. Negative components deal with the duty of
the state to prevent arbitrary and unlawful deprivation of life not only committed
by criminals but also by the state or its agents.65 Article 6(1), for example,
stipulates ‘[e]very human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be
protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life’.
Positive components oblige the state to adopt measures that are conducive
to allowing one to live.66 The positive components closely relate to controversy
over the abolition of the death penalty and its practice in some municipal legal
systems. In Article 6(2) of the ICCPR, it is mentioned that countries which have
not abolished the death penalty, may only impose a sentence of death for ‘the
most serious crimes’ pursuant to the law in force at the time of the indictment of
the crime. The law used as the basis for death penalty must not be contrary to
63

Ibid, 516.
General Comment No. 06: The right to life (art. 6):. 30/04/82. CCPR General Comment
No. 6. (General Comments), para 1, <http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/
84ab9690ccd81fc7c12563ed0046fae3?Opendocument> at 7 August 2006.
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the provisions of the ICCPR and to the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.67 Further, the death penalty can only be
carried out in accordance with a final judgment rendered by a competent court.68
Article 6(2), therefore, provides an exception to the right to life, that is a
sentence of death may still be imposed by a state as long as the state has not
ratified the Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR aiming at the abolition of
the death penalty pursuant to Article 1(1), ‘[no] one within the jurisdiction of a
State Party to the present Protocol shall be executed’.69 Despite the permissibility of the judicial imposition of the death penalty, the ICCPR strongly urge
state parties to abolish capital punishment in their legal system. This is pursuant
to Article 6(6) ‘[n]othing in this article shall be invoked to delay or to prevent
the abolition of capital punishment by any State Party to the present Covenant’.70
In addition, notwithstanding the loose obligation to totally abolish the death
penalty in Article 6(2) to 6(6); state parties to the Covenant are obliged to limit
its use and to abolish it for other than the ‘most serious crimes’ pursuant to
General Comment 6 of the ICCPR. Furthermore, the Committee comments
that the paragraphs of Article 6 strongly suggest that abolition is desirable.71 All
measures of abolition of the death penalty by state parties will thus be considered progress in the enjoyment of the right to life.72
In addition, given the supremacy of the right to life, Article 6 thus cannot
be derogated from state parties’ obligation under the ICCPR, even in times of
public emergency which threaten the life of the nation.73 (Except if the death
penalty has already existed in a state and it does not ratify the Second Optional
Protocol to the ICCPR).

67
The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide was approved
and proposed for signature and ratification or accession by General Assembly resolution 260 A
(III) of 9 December 1948.
68
See ICCPR, article 6(2).
69
The Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR aiming at the abolition of the death, article
1(1).
70
ICCPR, article 6(1), (2), (6).
71
General Comment No. 6, above n 63, para 6-7; see also Preamble of the Second Optional
Protocol to the ICCPR.
72
General Comment No. 6, above n 78, para 6; see also Preamble of the Second Optional
Protocol to the ICCPR.
73
ICCPR, article 4(2); see also General Comment No 6, above n 63, para 1.
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For state parties which still impose capital punishment, offences subject to
the death penalty must be contemplated in light of ‘the most serious crimes’.
According to the Committee, the expression must be read restrictively under
the aegis of conditions enshrined in Article 6(2), namely the judicial imposition
of the death penalty must be: a quite exceptional measure; pursuant to effective
law; compatible with the Covenant. A case in point is in Lubuto v Zambia
(390/90). In this case, the Human Rights Committee is of the view that the
judicial imposition of the death penalty upon the author in Zambia breaches
Article 6(2). This is because the use of firearms for aggravated robbery by the
author did not cause the death or wounding of any person. This circumstance,
then, was neglected by the court when imposing the sentence.74 Meanwhile, in
Brown v Jamaica (775/97), the Committee found that the mandatory imposition of a death sentence upon the author for ‘murder in aggravated circumstances’ did not violate Article 6(2). This is because law in Jamaica distinguishes between non-capital and capital murder. Capital murder is defined as
murder committed under aggravated circumstances. In the court, the author
was found guilty of capital murder. 75
It appears from the above that homicide falls within the category of ‘the
most serious crimes’, especially when committed under aggravated circumstances. For other crimes, the Human Rights Committee has confirmed that the
following crimes are not included in the notion of ‘most serious crimes’, namely:
treason; piracy;76 robbery;77 traffic in toxic or dangerous wastes;78 abetting
suicide; drug-related offences; property offences;79 multiple evasion of military

services which can be charged retroactively;80apostasy; committing a third homosexual act; embezzlement by officials; theft by force;81 ‘abduction not resulting in death’;82 crimes of an economic nature; adultery; corruption; crimes that
do not result in the loss of life;83 non-violent infringement;84 ‘a person whose life
endangers or corrupts society’ such as in the case of political and economic
offences.85
The judicial imposition of the death penalty for these crimes thus violates
Article 6 of the ICCPR, whilst intentional killings or attempted killings, and the
intentional infliction of grievous bodily harm may still be punished by the death
sentence under Article 6(2).86 However, when a state party applies the death
penalty for ‘the most serious crime’, the Committee emphasizes that ‘it must be
carried out in such a way as to cause the least possible physical and mental
suffering’.87 Thus, the method of execution is also a matter for the death penalty; otherwise, it will be considered a breach of Article 7 of the ICCPR. A case
in point is Ng v Canada (469/91). The Human Rights Committee agrees with
the author’s argument that gas asphyxiation is a method of execution that breaches
Article 7. This is because it may cause prolonged suffering and agony lasting for
more than ten minutes before the person sentenced-to-death dies.88
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Lubuto v Zambia (390/90) para 7.2., as quoted by Joseph, Schultz and Castan, above n
48, 166-167.
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Britain and Northern Ireland. 06/12/2001. CCPR/CO/73/UK; CCPR/CO/73/UKOT. (Concluding
Observations/Comments), para 37, <http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/
2153823041947eaec1256afb00323ee7?Opendocument> at 7 August 2006.
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Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Republic Korea, (1992) UN
doc. A/47/40, pp. 122-124, para 9, as quoted by Joseph, Schultz and Castan, above n 48, 167.
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(Symbol)/c76b4d85fe0cf84241256324003d7550?Opendocument> at 7 August 2006.
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Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Sri Lanka, (1996) UN doc.
CCPR/C/79/Add. 56. (Concluding Observations/Comments), para14, as quoted by Joseph, Schultz
and Castan, above n 48, 167.

Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Sudan. 19/11/1997. CCPR/C/
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(Symbol)/bc310a747155dff88025655300537fae?Opendocument> at 7 August 2006.
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CO/72/GTM. (Concluding Observations/Comments), para 17, <http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/
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by Joseph, Schultz and Castan, above n 48, 167
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www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/de8b82142ebec610802566db00574644?Opendocument> at
7August 2006.
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General Comment No. 20: Replaces general comment 7concerning prohibition of torture
and cruel treatment or punishment (art. 7): 10/03/92. CCPR General Comment No. 20 (General
Comments),
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The method of execution in Islamic criminal law may be stoning, crucifixion
or beheading carried out in public. These methods of execution may then breach
Article 7 since they are intended to and actually inflict prolonged pain and suffering. In addition, the minority of the Committee requires that for a method of
execution to breach Article 7, it must be intentionally brutal pursuant to Article
1 of the CAT.89 All methods of execution for the death penalty under Islamic
criminal law, may thus amount to torture, cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment or punishment as far as the ICCPR and CAT provisions are concerned.
C. Islamic Criminal Punishments and the Prohibition against Heinous
Punishments
Article 7 of the ICCPR prohibits torture or cruel, inhuman and degrading
treatment or punishment.90 Freedom from torture and the right to humane treatment is one of the few absolute rights in the Covenant which is not permitted to
be applied restrictively. Similar to Article 6, Article 7 it is a non-derogatory
right.91 The Human Rights Committee also reaffirms its non-derogatory status
in public emergency situations such as those referred to in Article 4 of the ICCPR.
Thus, the provision of Article 7 must remain in force even though the emergency
situation might threaten the life and existence of the nation. No justification or
mitigating circumstances may be invoked, the Committee emphasizes, to excuse a violation of Article 7 for any reason, including an order from a superior
officer or public authority.92
The prohibition against heinous punishments is closely related to the types
of punishment under Islamic criminal law. Amputation, flogging or stoning, technically, are among types of punishment which exist in Islamic criminal law literature. This thus becomes the most striking aspect of the conflict between Islamic
criminal law and international human rights law. The requirements of Islamic
criminal law sit uneasily with the obligation of Muslim countries to comply with
international human rights laws to which they are parties, when these types of
punishment are a concern.
The status of ratifications and reservations of the ICCPR and the CAT
89
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reveal that some states enforcing Islamic criminal law are not parties to the
covenants. Even if they are parties, however, they have not ratified or acceded
to the Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, aiming at the abolition of the death penalty. This situation exemplifies the uneasiness faced by Muslim countries enforcing Islamic criminal law
in balancing the requirements of their religious and international human rights
norms. Iran, for example, signed the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights on 4 April 1968 and ratified it on 24 June 1975. Sudan ratified it on
18 March 1986 whilst Libya and Nigeria acceded to it on 15 May 1970 and
28 July 1993, subsequently. Pakistan and Saudi Arabia have not ratified or
acceded to the ICCPR yet. 93
With regard to the Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, none of the
above states enforcing Islamic criminal law participated in the Forty-fourth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations whereby the Second Optional Protocol was adopted by Resolutions 44-128 of 15 December 1989.
Based on data in the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights per 8 May 2006, ratifications or accessions to the protocol have
not been adopted by these states.94
Akin to the ICCPR, the ratification of the Convention against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) 1984 also
varies among states enforcing Islamic criminal punishments. Iran and Pakistan
have not ratified or acceded to it yet. Libya acceded to it on 16 May 1989.
Nigeria signed it on 28 July 1988 and ratified it on 28 June 2001. Saudi Arabia
acceded to it on 23 September 1997, and Sudan signed it on 4 June 1986.95
Interestingly, Libya, Sudan, and Saudi Arabia have acceded to the CAT without reserving articles relating to cruel, inhuman or degrading punishments. Meanwhile, these countries have implemented Islamic criminal law which allows severe corporal punishments for some offences in their legal system.
93
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Ratifications and
Reservations of the ICCPR 1966’, <http://www.ohchr.org/english/countries/ratification/4.htm>
last update 8 May 2006, at 2 August 2006.
94
Ibid, ‘Ratifications and Reservations of the Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR’,
<http://www.ohchr.org/english/countries/ratification/12.htm> last update 8 May 2006, at 2 August
2006.
95
Ibid, ‘Ratifications and Reservations of the Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR’,
<http://www.ohchr.org/english/countries/ratification/9.htm> last update 8 May 2006. at 2 August
2006.
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The question then arises whether there are loopholes in the provisions of
the ICCPR and CAT which might allow state parties to impose heinous corporal punishments. This might be because the covenants do not specifically define
what constitutes cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment. The ICCPR, in fact,
generally does not provide any definition of the concepts covered by Article 7.
The Human Rights Committee itself seems to believe that it is unnecessary to
list prohibited acts or to establish distinctions between various types of punishment or treatment as they will depend on ‘the nature, purpose and severity of
the treatment applied’.96
Likewise, the CAT, which expands on the scope of the obligation under
Article 7 of the ICCPR, merely states that state parties to the covenant are
obliged to prevent acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment
which do not fall under the category ‘torture’ as defined in Article 1 of the CAT.
The preventive acts must be undertaken in any territory under each state party’s
jurisdiction and must be upheld by public officials or other persons acting in an
official capacity in carrying out their duties.97
Given the absence of a specific definition, Joseph, Schulzt and Castan,
conclude that the requirements of severity, intention, and purpose are thus applied more leniently in determining whether cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment has occurred.98 Hence, the relativism of human rights values may prevail since Muslim countries implementing Islamic criminal law can
argue that Islamic criminal law punishments cannot be regarded as cruel, inhuman or degrading because they are based on God’s law. 99
IV. ICCPR and CAT Ratification and Their Implementation in Some
Muslim Countries
A. Saudi Arabia
From 16 May 1981 to 18 April 1992, for example, there were more than
two-hundred hudud penalty occurrences in Saudi Arabia. Forty-five occurrences were penalties for theft (sariqa) by amputation of the right hand. Four

occurrences were penalties for adultery by stoning, while the other form of
adultery punishment for offenders never married, flogging, was not recorded
during the period. A hundred and seventy-seven occurrences were penalties
for offences categorized as brigandage including court convictions for brigandage (hiraba), killing ghilatan (heinous murder), and ta’zir by the death penalty, and execution siyasatan on the King’s authority.100 All penalties for this
category are by beheading, except one by shooting in 1984, four by crossamputations in 1985, two by crucifixion after stoning in 1990 and 1991. All
offenders stoned for adultery were Muslims, while the other penalties were
enforced both on Muslims and non-Muslims.101
Since acceding to the CAT in 1997, however, Saudi Arabia’s courts have
continued to prescribe corporal punishments and bodily mutilations for a wide
range of offences and they are even imposed on children. This is so because
three categories of crimes and punishments under Islamic criminal law are applied in Saudi Arabia, namely hudud (fixed punishments), qisas (retaliation)
and ta‘zir (discretionary punishments for all other offences not covered under
hudud and qisas).
Thus, when flogging is imposed as a hudud punishment, the maximum number of lashes is 100; yet, when it is imposed as a ta‘zir punishment, flogging has
no upper limit. Amnesty International reports that the highest number of lashes
recorded to have been imposed on a prisoner was 4,750 lashes.102 Another
example of excessive flogging under ta‘zir punishment is sentences for three
people convicted on drug charges in June 2001. Each of them got 1,500 lashes
in addition to fifteen years’ imprisonment to be carried out during the whole
period of imprisonment at a rate of fifty lashes every six months.103
As a consequence of ta‘zir, flogging is also imposed as an extra-judicial
punishment for traffic offences and anyone suspected of harassing women. Both
crimes, in fact, are not prescribed in the main sources of Islamic laws (the
Koran and the Hadith) and traditional concept of Islamic criminal law. Flog100
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See Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
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ging for these offences is carried out by the Mutawa’een in a number of provinces based on orders from the Emir of the province to arrest and flog suspects
without due process of justice.104

in Medina in August 2001.109 This was so since qisas punishment means causing injury to the offender similar to the injury caused to the victim.

Expanding ta‘zir punishment for harassing women, as a consequence, has
a great impact on the extra-judicial imposition of flogging. Hundreds of people,
many of them youths, have been subjected to immediate flogging in Saudi Arabia.
By September 2001, as reported by al-Riyadh Arabic daily newspaper, 172
youths in Riyadh alone had been flogged a total of 2,560 lashes in the wake of
the campaign to stop the harassment of girls.105

B. Sudan
Sudan’s experience with the implementation of Islamic criminal law is closely
akin to that of Saudi Arabia. The 1983 Sudanese Penal Code regulated both
hudud and ta‘zir crimes. Offences fall under category hudud crimes thus were
punishable by amputation, public flogging or capital punishment pursuant to the
classical doctrine of Islamic criminal law. Ta‘zir crimes in the Code, however,
were problematic as far as the traditional hudud crimes were concerned. The
Code wanted to extend the scope of hudud but it was not done in accordance
with rigorous standards of the traditional hudud crimes such as by broadening
the definition and by relaxing the rule of evidence.110

This situation has lead to strong criticisms from the Committee on the Rights
of the Child, given that Saudi Arabia acceded to the Convention on the Rights
of the Child (CRC) on 26 January 1996.106 In March 2000, Saudi Arabia then
assured the Committee that corporal punishment of children was prohibited.
Considering the implementation of Islamic criminal law in Saudi Arabia, however, the Committee felt it necessary to recommend that Saudi Arabia:
[t]ake all necessary steps to end the imposition of corporal punishment,
including flogging and other forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment and
punishment, on persons who may have committed crimes when they were under 18 … .107
With regard to amputation which is prescribed under both hudud (for theft
and brigandage) and qisas, Amnesty International recorded that there had been
thirty-three amputations and nine cross-amputations since 1997 which was when
the Convention came into force in Saudi Arabia.108 An example of qisas punishment is the case of Abdel Moti Abdel Rahman Mohammad. He was a 37year-old-Egyptian national who faced a judicial punishment of qisas after the
court found him guilty of disfiguring Shahata Ajami Mahmoud, a 53-year-old
Egyptian, by throwing acid at his face and damaging his left eye. The culprit was
then subjected to forcible surgical removal of his left eye at King Fahd Hospital
105
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Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Ratification and
Reservation of the Convention on the Rights of the Child’, <http://www.ohchr.org/english/
countries/ratification/11.htm#N16> last update 8 May 2006, at 7 August 2006.
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See Concluding observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child: Saudi Arabia.
22/02/2001.CRC/C/15/Add.148, para 34, <http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/
83d5295595532530c12569ed00585df4?Opendocument> at 7 August 2006.
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Amnesty International, above n 101, 18.

Article 458(3) of the Code, in fact, laid down a rule that ‘if a defendant
cannot be sentenced to a fixed punishment [hudud] because of uncertainty
(shubha), the court may impose any punishment that it sees fit, even if the act as
such is not mentioned in the code’.111 Article 3 of the 1983 Judgments (Basic
Rules) Act gives further discretionary powers to judges in the absence of an
applicable legislative provision since the judges are required to apply Islamic
law. 112 As a consequence, any offence might be penalized under the Code and
any punishment might be imposed by the courts despite the lack of a provision
regulating it.
A case in point is theft. Article 320 of the 1983 Sudanese Penal Code
provided wider criteria than those required by the tradition since the Code did
not require that ‘the theft be surreptitious or that the thief takes the stolen object
from a safe place’.113 There was a case when a bookkeeper of a state school
was punished with amputation on grounds that the bookkeeper had pocketed
money by falsifying the record of the list of the school’s employees. The sentence was executed immediately without giving the bookkeeper a chance to
appeal.114
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Given the classical doctrine on theft, according to Rudolph Peters, such a
sentence contradicts it in two points: first, ‘the bookkeeper did not take the
money surreptitiously from a safe place’;115 second, the bookkeeper took state
money: a circumstance which is typically regarded as shubha hindering the
application of a hudud crime because ‘the thief might have believed that [he/
she] was entitled to take [his/her] share from the common property of all Muslims’.116
The 1983 Evidence Act relaxed the rules for hudud crimes, including the
high standard of evidence provided under Shariah law, to be established in the
courts’ decisions. Two Muslim male witnesses of good reputation (four in the
case of unlawful sex), for example, can be replaced simply by the testimony of
other witnesses at the discretion of the court.117117 The 1983 Evidence Act,
article 77, 78, as quoted by Safia Safwat, ‘Sudan’, in Eugene Cotran and Chibli
Mallat (eds.), Yearbook of Islamic and Middle Eastern Law Volume 1 (1995)
243.
Circumstantial evidence is admitted in many cases: the pregnancy of an
unmarried woman may thus become evidence used to penalize her under unlawful sex provision;118 or, possession of stolen goods may be evidence of
theft.119
It is reported that between 92 and 120 judicial amputations were carried
out in the aftermath of the promulgation of the 1983 Sudanese Penal Code to
April 1985. Along with the catchall nature of the Code’s provisions and the
lower standard of evidence rules, many acts resembling hudud offences are
then made punishable as ta‘zir crimes. Flogging, often combined with imprisonment, was thus extensively applied.120

Facing serious criticisms against the 1983 Sudanese Penal Code being
enforced, the government enacted a new penal code together with its criminal
procedure in 1991. This was done after Sudan acceded to the CAT in 1986.
Hudud crimes in the Code now only prevail for those who live in northern
Sudan. People living in southern Sudan are exempt from the Code unless they
want to be tried under Shariah law. 121
The new penal code, however, still prescribes corporal punishments such
as flogging or a variety of offences and limb amputations for robbery of more
than 4.25 grams of gold in a guarded place.122 Criminal liability begins with, but
not before, the age of fifteen and no later than the age of eighteen.123 This
provision is thus still in conflict with the CRC since corporal punishment may
still be imposed on children convicted of, for example, drinking alcohol, causing
annoyance, behaving in a public place contrary to public morality, or wearing
indecent or immoral clothing in an indecent manner or contrary to public morality.124
Compared to the old Code, the 1991 Sudanese Penal Code is generally
viewed as more in agreement with the traditional doctrine definition of hudud
offences. Since the 1983 Judgment (Basic Rules) Act is still effective and the
1983 Evidence Act remains in force, however, a court can still sentence perpetrators of acts that do not fall under the wording of the 1991 Penal Code
because such acts can be established as hudud crimes in the courts quite easily.125
As a result, the situation in Sudan before and after acceding to the Covenant may not significantly differ in terms of freedom from cruel, inhuman or
degrading punishment. Amnesty International recorded that five men were sentenced to cross-amputation after being convicted of brigandage during January
25-27, 2001.126
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C. Nigeria
Human Rights Watch reports that since early 2002, no executions or amputations have taken place in Nigeria and death penalties have generally been
overturned by the court of appeal. However, the Shariah courts continuously
pronounce capital punishments. This is so because the jurisdiction of Shariah
courts in twelve out of thirty-six states of Nigeria has been extended to hearing
criminal cases since 2000.127

lim. Hence, the Islamization movement has become a reaction to challenge the
federal government and a momentum to reassert Muslim political power. There
is also widespread belief among northern Nigeria Muslims that for them to be
stronger politically, Islamic norms for public life should be imposed so that God
will help them to realize their goals. Lastly, like in other states enforcing Shariah
law, the introduction of Islamic criminal law is considered ‘a conscious reassertion
of cultural roots against Western political and cultural dominance’.131

The introduction of Islamic criminal law in Nigeria happened after Nigeria
ratified the CAT in 2001. Because Nigeria is a federal republic, the obligation
of Nigeria to comply with the Covenant becomes more complex. This is because legislation in the domain of criminal law may be enacted by individual
states of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. Thus, it is a matter for the separate
state federation to introduce the Shariah penal code.128 Zamfara was the first
state in Nigeria to promulgate the Shariah penal code on 27 January 2005.
Previously, Zamfara had established Shariah courts to implement Islamic law.
Niger state then followed Zamfara’s lead to re-Islamize its legal system.129

Given the above factors, twelve Northern states had extended the jurisdiction of the Shariah courts to try crimes charged under the Shariah penal code
by April 2002. On the strength of the above factors, and facilitated by the
Shariah courts laws, it was declared that the provisions of the Koran and the
Hadith and the legal opinions of the Malikite school of law had to be applied
by the courts. Katsina and Sokoto states even pronounced and executed crossamputation before a Shariah criminal code came into force.132 Thus, despite
having acceded to the CAT, corporal and capital punishments are still imposed
in Nigeria.

Unlike Zamfara’s and Niger’s governments which fully support the program, other states’ steps to introduce Islamic criminal law were prompted by
popular pressure. Geographically, Nigeria is divided into northern and southern
Nigeria and predominant Muslim populations live in the northern part. Triggered by the re-Islamization of the legal system in Zamfara and Niger, large
sections of the Muslims of the North put pressure on their governments, which
were not too enthusiastic about the program, to promulgate Islamic criminal
law. 130
According to Rudolph Peters, while religious zeal plays a role in these
demands, social and political factors are far outweighed. First, many Muslims
in northern Nigeria believe that Islamic criminal law would be able to overcome
criminality and government corruption rampant in their areas. Second, the call
for Islamic criminal law is purported to be a protest against federal politics. This
is so because after the demise of the military dictatorship in 1997, the political
centre of gravity moved to Southern Nigeria, which is predominantly non-Mus-

D. Lack of a Specific Definition and Relativism of Human Rights
The prevailing interpretation of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment has included all forms of corporal punishment as heinous. The Human Rights Committee expounds that any act causing the victim physical pain
as well as mental suffering amounts to cruel, inhuman, degrading treatment or
punishment prohibited by Article 7. Corporal punishment thus cannot be imposed by states ratifying or acceding to the Covenants. According to the Committee, even excessive chastisement ordered as an educational or disciplinary
measure is equivalent to that imposed on a criminal. This is so because Article 7
also purportedly protects, in particular, children, pupils and patients in teaching
and medical institutions.133
For example in Higginson v Jamaica (792/98), the Human Rights Committee confirms that a breach of Article 7 stands simply with the execution and
the mere imposition of a sentence of corporal punishment. Corporal punishment in this case was the use of the tamarind switch for whipping. Whipping
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with the birch imposed on the culprit in the case Sooklal v Trinidad and Tobago (928/00) also constitutes a breach.134 In addition, there are several concluding observations from the Committee affirming the incompatibility of corporal punishment with Article 7, despite the supervision of a medical doctor
during execution.135
Having investigated corporal punishments in state parties, including in states
enforcing Islamic criminal law, the Special Rapporteur on Torture and Cruel,
Degrading and Inhuman Treatment or Punishment to the UN Commission on
Human Rights states that corporal punishment is inconsistent with the prohibition against torture and other cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment or punishment documented in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the ICCPR,
the Declaration on the Protection of All persons against Being Subjected to
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and
the CAT.136 Further, the Commission on Human Rights adopted a resolution in
2003 whereby a slightly less categorical principle was formulated. The Commission reminds state parties’ governments that corporal punishment, whether
imposed on adults or children, can amount to cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment or even to torture.137
The above stance concurs with some studies which analyze the compatibility of the traditional concept of Islamic criminal law with human rights. Katerina
Dalacoura, for example, argues that in its traditional understandings, the Shariah
law does not contain or uphold the concept of human rights. This is because
submission to God and duty are emphasized more in the heart of Islamic justice
than the notion of human rights itself. 138 Specifically analyzing hudud punishments, Ann Elizabeth Mayer points out that they are inconsistent ‘with modern

penological principles and modern human rights norms’.139
The above arguments, however, are rebutted by Muslim scholars who define human rights in an exclusively Islamic framework by making the Shariah
superior to other norms.140 They strongly reject the categorization of hudud
punishments as ‘cruel and inhuman’. To them, the hudud punishments cannot
be compared to the man-made cruel and inhuman categorization since they are
based on the divine revelation contained in the Koran and the Hadith; thus,
they are not subject to change or alteration.141 Believing in the superiority of
Shariah over any other man-made laws, Muslim countries pronounced their
own human rights treaty in the Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam.142
By adopting this treaty, Muslim countries joined under the Organization of the
Islamic Conference (OIC) wish ‘… to contribute to the efforts of mankind to
assert human rights, to protect man from exploitation and persecution, and to
affirm his freedom and right to a dignified life in accordance with the Islamic
Shari’ah’.143 As far as the Shariah is concerned, Muslim countries therefore
maintain the imposition of capital punishment in their legal systems for ‘[l]ife is a
God-given gift and the right to life is guaranteed to every human being … and it
is prohibited to take away life except for a Shari’ah prescribed reason’.144
Yet, Muslim countries’ enthusiasm for the observance of the requirements
of Shariah law regarding criminal punishment is often not followed by implementing its meticulous procedures. The judicial process in some states enforcing Islamic criminal law is far below the standards of a fair trial. There is no
equality before the courts and tribunals; lack of time and facilities for the prepa-
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ration of the accused’s defence and for communication with his/her counsel are
among poor standards found by human rights organizations. Amnesty International, for example, reported the situation with the Shariah courts in Sudan in
2003:
In the public order courts, the defendants - usually the poor, including many
living in displaced camps and a large number of women - rarely or ever have
lawyers, and trials may take only a few minutes. Defendants are gathered in
groups of around 10 according to their offence ... Conviction is almost invariable on the simple word of a police officer and hardly ever in the presence of
defence counsel ... The presumption is one of guilt, not innocence and evidence
to corroborate police statements is completely absent ... It is widely said that
someone from a rich family, who has a mobile telephone and has connections,
may get a lawyer and be acquitted; the poor are invariably convicted.145145
Amnesty International, above n 118, 20.
Another example is in Saudi Arab. Amnesty International reported that
unfair trials and arbitrary detention were still to be found in 2007. The court
proceedings for crimes subject to the death penalty are even worse so far as
the international standards for a fair trial are concerned. It is reported that the
defendants are often not formally represented by a lawyer, and the courts simply mete out sentences based on the defendants’ confession acquired under
duress, torture or deception.146 A case in point is the capital case of Ma’idh AlSaleem. Amnesty International reported that he was arrested in 2001 when
aged 16. During his detention, it is reported that he was tortured for several
days until he confessed to having stated something against the Shar‘iah. The
court then sentenced him to death. Yet, he got a reduction in the appeals court
to 14 years’ imprisonment and 4,000 lashes. He was then acquitted owing to
King Abdullah’s pardon in November 2007.147
V. Concluding Remarks : Negotiating the Requirements of Islamic
Criminal Law and International Human Rights Instruments
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Whether rights enshrined in the core international human rights instruments
should prevail in all nations around the world has become a very contentious
issue since the very beginning of their formulation. There are at least two major
schools of thought with regard to the validity of international human rights norms
when applied in diverse cultures, namely universalism and cultural relativism. 148
Each pole claims that its arguments on the issue are sounder than those of the
other, which makes the effort to reconcile both claims, seem to be impossible.
Advocates of universalism, for example, maintain that international human
rights norms can be applied in all cultural contexts. Everyone has these rights
owing to his or her status as a human being regardless of his or her race, gender,
class, religion, or ethnic origin. Thus, what a culture perceives regarding the
right to equal protection, physical security, free speech or freedom of religion
must be the same however other cultures perceive them. Universalists claim
that such rights are natural and inalienable to protect an individual from any
oppression and violations by the state and society.149 In contrast, advocates of
cultural relativism object to the application of universal standards of human
rights equally to all cultures and societies without due regard the traditional and
cultural differences. For the cultural relativists, the application might imply a
Western cultural imposition.150150 See ibid, 366-367. Ruth Benedict points out
that for cultural relativism there is infinite cultural variability and there are no
absolutes; see Ruth Benedict, Patterns of Culture (1934) 45-46.
From the Anthropological perspective, it is believed that all societies have
some form of moral system since the practice of evaluating their experiences as
virtuous or unworthy exists everywhere. It is the omnipresence of behavioral
moral evaluation which makes human beings different from other organisms.151
Given different cultures, the values adopted by a society may differ from one
another. As it has been argued by Hatch, ‘[i]t is the content of moral principles,
not their existence, that is variable among human beings’.152
When moral principles are documented into an international normative framework, the moral principles are then universalized. The General Assembly, for
example, proclaims that the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Right is the
148
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common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations. The UDHR
itself also employs such generalizing terms in its provision. The problem is, the
Declaration is criticized as a document which is based simply on Western political philosophies and, therefore, does not address non-Western aspirations and
priorities.153 Given the differences, cultural relativists call on societies to refer to
their own cultures as the source of the validity of a moral right or rule.
However, the cultural relativist’s stance is criticized as based merely on
utter confusion regarding human rights and human dignity, and between rights
and duties. Based on the analysis of the political culture of human rights in
Islam, traditional Africa, Confucian China, Hindu India, and in the Soviet Union,
Jack Donnelly argues that the practice of human rights, including the very concept, are absent in most non-Western cultural and political traditions.154 Furthermore, the critical character of human rights, namely that rights are inalienable, would be threatened by the incorporation of third world views, such as
valuing the group or the community over individuals. As a consequence, human
rights may be denied, which would then justify their violation by the state.155
Given the above, the answer to the question ‘can the requirements of Shariah
law regarding criminal punishments be interpreted in a way that is compatible
with the ICCPR and CAT?’ is complex. The answer will very much depend on
which perspective of the validity of international human rights norms is employed, i.e., universalism versus cultural relativism. Favouring one particular
perspective or the other will not resolve the problem of how to balance the
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requirements of Islamic criminal law and international human rights instruments.
This is because universalism may promote a moral vision in protecting individual rights from violations perpetrated by the state; yet, too much emphasis
on universalism without due regard for the values of the Shariah law may lead
to the rejection of international human rights instruments. This is so since religious tenets strongly influence Muslims on matters related to criminal law. 156
Hence, an approach which tries to reconcile the claims of universality and cultural relativity on international human rights norms is desirable.
There have been some attempts by scholars to mediate between Universalists and Cultural Relativists. Employing Rawl’s concept of overlapping consensus, Heiner Bielefeldt suggests a cross-cultural overlapping consensus on
human rights. This is purported to be a method able to bridge the gap created
between universalists and cultural relativists regarding the applicability of international human rights norms in other cultures. This method might be effective,
especially where there exist a complex relationship between the idea of political
justice in a modern liberal society and the multiplicity of religious or philosophical convictions on human rights embraced by the members of that society. 157
An Islamic scholar on human rights, Abdullah Ahmad An-Na’im, has also
tried to reconcile Universalism with Cultural Relativism in the context of human
rights in Islam by proposing the formalization of a cross-cultural approach to
human rights. To An-Na’im, the current and foreseeable new human rights cannot be seen as truly universal unless they are conceived and articulated within
the widest possible range of cultural traditions. As a normative propositions,
An-Na’im further argues, international human rights norms are much more credible and thereby are likely to be implemented since various cultural traditions in
the world will perceive them as legitimate.158
For this mediating approach to be successful in Islam, new interpretations
of the Koranic verses relating to hudud punishments employing an ample methodology of Islamic legal theory is also instrumental. There are enormous challenges, however, to reinterpreting hudud-related verses in the Koran in light of
international human rights norms which prohibit cruel, inhuman, or degrading
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treatment or punishment, especially in Muslim countries where a traditionalconservative approach to Islamic religious texts has been adopted. This is because technically, all hudud-related verses in the Koran are deemed to be definitive texts (muhkamat); thus, the types of punishment they prescribe must be
unquestionable. The direction of Islamic law development in traditional-conservative Muslim countries tends to emphasize the strict application of the Koran and the Sunnah, instead. Any modern-liberal interpretations of hudud-related verses will thus be challenged as un-Islamic (or even heretic), for human
beings with all their attendant fallibilities will not be able to receive the true
messages of the Shariah law requirements regarding criminal punishments enshrined in the Koran and Hadith.159
Given this, a cross-cultural approach and reinterpretation of the hudud will
not be able to completely annul so-called cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in Muslim countries which implement Islamic criminal law,
especially if these countries adopt the traditional-conservative approach to the
Islamic religious texts. Yet, there is much to be done to limit their execution from
the classical theory of Islamic criminal law. Many have argued that the true
implementation of Islamic criminal law requires the existence of an Ideal Islamic
society; a society in which Islamic values such as justice, social responsibility
and social welfare are internalized. Consequently, if a theft is a by-product of
injustice and social ignorance rampant in the community, the context in which a
thief commits such crime must be considered carefully prior to imposing hand
mutilation.160 This is in line with the true message of the Koran and the Hadith
regarding Islamic criminal punishments whereby extreme caution in inflicting
any punishment is strongly emphasized.161

To sum up, both the requirements of the Islamic criminal law and of the
ICCPR and CAT can therefore be mediated, inter alia, by strictly adhering to
the procedural and evidential requirements prescribed by the Koran which is
then theorized by classical Islamic jurists. This method is expected to effectively
pacify criticisms from both human rights advocates and from proponents of the
Shariah law regarding the implementation of Islamic criminal punishments in
Muslim countries which are parties to the ICCPR and CAT. This, in fact, has
been practiced in Nigeria where two women, Safiyya Husaini and Amina Lawal
who had been sentenced to death in 2002 and 2003 for committing adultery,
were acquitted by the appeal courts of Katsina state and Sokoto state. The
appeal court judges dismissed the stoning punishment on the strength of Islamic
criminal law procedures, to which all Shariah court judges should be fully bound,
but which had been neglected by the lower Shariah court judges. They are:
first, the lack of four irreproachable eye-witnesses to the actual unlawful sexual
intercourse; second, the failure of the lower Shariah court judges to advise the
accused and provide a full and comprehensive explanation of the legal meaning
of zina pursuant to the doctrine of classical hudud prior to imposing the stoning
sentence.162 Meanwhile, both conditions are required in zina crime litigation by
the classical doctrine of Islamic criminal law. 163
Since this solution will lead to the extensive application of ta’zir punishments, it is necessary for Muslim countries to elevate the standard of the ta’zir
investigation process in accordance with international human right norms as
well as to start replacing corporal punishment in ta’zir indictments with other
punishments pursuant to ICCPR and CAT. This can be done because ta’zir is
discretionary; the state is free to determine what kinds of remedy will restore
social order.

There have been some cases where liberal interpretations of legal verses in the Koran
(including hudud-related verses) were rejected, followed by a ban against their dissemination.
This was done by the Muslim countries’ governments on the strength of demands from orthodox
Muslim scholars. A case in point is the ban against Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd in Egypt.
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